Political economy theory expects politicians to use budget de…cits to engineer an electiontimed boom, known as the political business cycle. We challenge and contextualize this view by incorporating the …nancial constraints faced by governments into an electoral framework. Employing a formal model, we show theoretically that the extent of ownership dispersion among creditors has important e¤ects for governments' policy autonomy. Based on our theoretical results, we argue when highly-indebted governments become more reliant on international bond markets -as opposed to traditional bank lending -politicians alter the way they respond to domestic constituents. In an econometric test of 16 Latin American countries from 1961 to 2011, we show that …nancial decentralization breeds austerity. More speci…cally, we …nd that politicians exhibit more …scal discipline when they fund a greater share of their spending through decentralized bond markets. Furthermore, we …nd this disciplining e¤ect to be particularly strong during election periods.
1 Introduction "The old saying holds. Owe your banker one thousand pounds and you are at his mercy; owe him 1 million pounds and the position is reversed. " -John Maynard Keynes In response to the 2008-2009 global …nancial crisis, some countries such as the United States attempted to stimulate their economies to protect jobs and wages. When facing …nancial crises, developing-country governments -and highly-indebted countries more generally -often face a more limited set of options. Narrow tax bases and shallow domestic …nancial markets can leave them dependent on foreign …nancing to fund their budgetary operations (Gavin and Perotti 1997) . For example, in Latin America -a region known for its historically high indebtedness, external …nancing has accounted for more than three-quarters of total public debt over the last three decades (InterAmerican Development Bank 2013).
In this environment, foreign creditors frequently impose austerity on their sovereign borrowers, expecting that such restrictive budgetary policies provide economic stability and ultimately make debt repayment more likely. However, the pursuit of such budget discipline can be problematic domestically. If politicians achieve discipline by shrinking welfare programs, their e¤orts to stabilize the economy could aggravate social tensions. For example, throughout Latin America, when austerity translated into lower public payrolls, pensions, and social bene…ts, …scal overtures that were intended to appease creditors often catalyzed pot-banging popular protests, known as cacerolazos.
In light of these tensions between international investors and domestic citizens, what determines whether or not debtor governments ultimately pursue …scal restraint?
In this paper, we argue that the likelihood of observing economic discipline in highly indebted countries re ‡ects the structure of government debt, or the extent to which government creditors are bondholders rather than bankers. In other words, we suspect that an increase in a government's reliance on international bond markets alters the way its politicians respond to domestic constituents. We anticipate observing both a general e¤ect, and an electoral e¤ect.
We develop a formal model of political behavior among incumbent politicians. Using this model, we derive results showing that the way a country …nances its debt has implications for its preelection public spending decisions. Speci…cally, we show that …nancial decentralization constrains incumbents from using public spending to signal competence to the electorate in managing the economy. We then examine our theoretical predictions using a cross-national statistical analysis of Latin America over the past …ve decades.
Based on a combination of our theoretical and empirical …ndings, we claim that global …nan-cial securitization has changed the traditional political logic, making political business cycles less common. Budget de…cits, intended to engineer economic booms and win votes, were once considered critical weapons of political survival in Latin America. However, after the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America, a shift in external funding from centralized bank lending to decentralized bond …nancing transformed creditor-debtor relations. Creditors interacting with these indebted countries have changed from a limited number of large institutions -typically large banks -to a substantial number of globally dispersed bond market investors. This shift toward securitization diluted the tight, …nancial linkage between creditors and their heavily-indebted borrowers, allowing them to escape the Keynesian paradox referenced above. Compared to vested bankers, bondholders can more readily exit their lending relationships, leaving governments with less room to manage the economy. Their constant threat of capital withdrawal compels sovereign debtors to pursue austerity with commitments to balanced budgets and low in ‡ation.
These theoretical claims mark a notable departure from political business cycle theories that assert an electoral in ‡ationary bias (Nordhaus 1975; Lindbeck 1976; Tufte 1978) . Such cycles may at times occur, as evidenced by President Cristina Fernández Kirchner's 2011 election-timed expansion in Argentina, but they are most likely to appear in countries that are less reliant on global capital markets. Argentina, for example, has been shut out of global capital markets since its 2002 debt default.
By comparison, we …nd that governments with high bond market indebtedness often pursue restrictive policies that yield electoral cycles marked by slowing rates of election-year in ‡ation and growth. These …ndings are in line with recent research on context-conditional political business cycles by Canes-Wrone and Park (2012) , which …nds that domestic …xed investment in developed countries is conditional on the electoral cycle. We advance this burgeoning literature by explicitly considering the role of international investment in electoral cycles in developing countries. We examine the conditions under which external …nancing both fosters and constrains the traditional political business cycle by evaluating its e¤ect on …scal policy, economic growth, and in ‡ation. 1 1 Our …ndings are also in line with the notion that elections can be a catalyst for economic reforms (Remmer 1993). This analysis also gives us new insights into the political business cycle in developing countries, which scholars have recently and extensively analyzed using models of asymmetric information.
In these …scal policy models, voters are typically cognizant of politicians' motivations. However, they lack perfect information about their policy actions, which allows politicians to increase public spending to improve their re-election chances. This literature is based on a …rst generation of signaling models by Rogo¤ (1990) and a second generation of moral hazard models spurred by Brender and Drazen (2005) and Shi and Svensson (2006) . Our formal theory builds on the latter.
In our model, voters are rational but imperfectly informed about government actions. Politicians are also less than perfectly informed about the expected consequences of their policy decisions.
Our results are consistent with empirical studies that …nd a political de…cit cycle in developing economies, and with results that predict the pattern to be more common in new democracies (Barberia and Avelino 2011; Shi and Svensson 2006; Gonzalez 2002; Block 2001; Schuknecht 2000; Ames 1987; Brender and Drazen 2005) . However, we make the novel contribution that such cycles are conditional on the structure of government debt. When a highly-indebted nation's external debt is comprised mostly of global bonds, politicians are constrained from using budget de…cits to manage the economy before elections.
The arguments in the article also engage the important debate in international and comparative political economy about the relationship between modern …nancial globalization and democracy, as explored in Frieden (1991) . On one side, some argue that contemporary global market integration represents a setback for democracy, …nding that governments pursue policies that favor capitalists over other social groups (Frieden 1991; Andrews 1994; Helleiner 1994; Cerny 1995; Rodrik 1997) . On the other side are those who have long argued that markets and democracy can live in harmony. This can be the case when governments intervene directly to o¤set globalization's dislocations (Cameron 1978; Garrett 1998 ). In addition, governments' e¤orts to boost investor con…dence can improve living standards and help stabilize democracies (Przeworksi and Wallerstein 1982; Przeworksi et. al. 2000) . Most recently, political economy scholars have sought to advance the globalization debate by exploring both the nature of the external constraint and the ability of governments to insulate their populace from global market pressures (McNamara 1998; Mosley 2000 Mosley , 2003 Rudra 2002; Swank 2002; Bearce 2003; Wibbels 2006; Tomz 2007; Pepinsky 2008; Nooruddin and Simmons 2009 ).
For example, recent research on …nancial market-government relations establishes that …nancial integration constrains di¤erent types of governments (i.e. developing vs. developed; democracies vs. autocracies; crisis vs. non-crisis countries; manufacturing vs. commodity exporters; peer vs. non-peer sovereign risk categorizations) in distinct ways (Mosley 2003; Saiegh 2005; Wibbels 2006; Campello 2014; Brooks, Cunha, and Mosley 2014) . Our analysis brings a new set of considerations to this work, arguing that di¤erent creditors -from bankers to bondholders -often behave quite uniquely, creating important di¤erences in policy climates for sovereign borrowers. We show that creditors who fail to overcome their collective action problem are counterintuitively more likely to in ‡uence governments'policy choices.
Finally, the analysis has implications for the study of partisan politics in developing democracies. In Latin America, for instance, scholars have identi…ed broad ideological swings, where the left either tolerated or advanced neoliberal reforms in the 1990s (Roberts 1998; Stokes 2001; Murillo 2002; Weyland 2002; Levitsky 2003) , only to later reverse these policies (Roberts 2013) . In fact, scholars have found that a variety of factors facilitated this consensus, including a weak labor movement (Roberts 1998) , party-brand dilution (Lupu 2015) , strong business interests (Thacker 2000; Fair…eld 2010) , and reform-seeking politicians (Corrales 2000) . In a region where government's budget is key to addressing redistributive pressures, however, why would the left tolerate austerity? Baker (2008) and Baker and Greene (2011) suggest that these actions re ‡ect the region's attitudes, …nding that Latin American citizens surprisingly hold centrist economic policy preferences. For example, Tomz (2001) …nds that the majority of Argentine voters were against debt default in 1999, preferring that the government comply with its international …nancial commitments. Similarly, Hellwig (2014) shows that globalization has crowded out contestation over economic policy, increasing the importance of noneconomic issues to voters. Our analysis presents a supply-side explanation for this demand-side phenomena. We …nd that in Latin America -a region where bond …nancing continues to account for almost half of total public external debtgovernments with a high exposure to global capital markets are more likely to adopt economic discipline to appease bondholders.
The article unfolds as follows. The next section contains the main theoretical contribution; here we explain how a government's debt structure induces politicians to prioritize budget discipline and price stability over …scal stimulus. In the subsequent section, we provide quantitative empirical support for this theory using data from Latin America -a region known for its high dependence on external …nancing. We then use the insights derived from our theoretical and quantitative results to interpret a number of recent elections both within and beyond Latin America's borders, including Southern Europe -a region that has also struggled lately with high bond indebtedness. Finally, we suggest some potentially fruitful research extensions.
Theoretical Framework
Why are politicians in highly indebted countries sometimes willing to impose austerity? In this section, we present a formal model of electoral politics and propose that the composition of sovereign debt is a key determinant of budgetary discipline. More speci…cally, our model shows that the extent of ownership dispersion among international creditors can have an important e¤ect on a government's policy autonomy. Our reasoning is based on a counterintuitive collective action logic. In the world of …nance, we can think of a country's solvency as a collective good for creditors.
Steady debt repayment bene…ts all creditors, no matter their size or stake in the borrower's …nancial a¤airs. However, when a borrower ‡irts with default, we argue that concentrated bank creditors are more likely to continue their lending to keep a country a ‡oat than decentralized bondholders.
We now make this reasoning more precise.
In our model, an incumbent political decision-maker interacts with a number of investors and the citizens (voters) of a country, over an in…nite number of periods. In each period, the incumbent politician has to decide how much to borrow and spend on public goods. Voters care both about their private consumption and their access to public goods. Incumbent politicians share voters' preferences, but also care about holding political o¢ ce. By comparison, investors care only about maximizing their investment returns.
Formally, the players of the model are two parties or politicians, A and B, a group of M voters indexed by i 2 f1; 2; 3; ::; M g, and N political investors indexed by j 2 f1; 2; :::; N g. We will …rst specify the incentives of voters, politicians, and investors, before outlining the constraints they each confront. The utility function for an individual voter is:
The …rst component of the voter's utility function, u(c t i ), is an increasing and concave function that represents the utility voter i receives from from private consumption in time period t. We assume that it takes the following functional form: u(c t i ) = log(c t i ). All citizens have the same income, w, in every period. Their consumption in period t equals their income minus what they pay in taxes: c t i = w t . The second component, g t , is the utility received from the public goods provided by the government. Since the income and tax payment, as well as the utility from public spending, is the same for all voters within a period, we will leave out the subscript, so u(c t ) and g t will denote the utility from consumption and public spending for a representative voter in period t.
These two utility components are then summed over all time periods, with later periods discounted by the factor 2 (0; 1).
Like voters, politicians care about private consumption and public goods. However, they also have intrinsic preferences for holding political o¢ ce. We are agnostic about the basis of this intrinsic value -it may be due to an inherent value placed on holding o¢ ce or explicit …nancial bene…ts -and simply assume that a bene…t E is received by any elected politician. If I t is an indicator that takes on the value of one if the politician is in o¢ ce at time t, and zero otherwise, the utility of a politician is thus:
We assume the value of holding political o¢ ce, E, is greater when the number of investors is smaller (holding everything else …xed). Our reasoning behind this assumption, which will be important in the equilibrium analysis, is that a world with a smaller number of (large) investors is one where politicians and investors are more likely to know each other. It is therefore likely to be a more comfortable and stable world for the politicians, where they can readily exchange information with investors in boardroom negotiations.
Turning to the investors: they only care about maximizing their investment returns. At the beginning of the game, each investor has pre-existing investments in this country equal to x = X=N , where X is the total amount of capital already invested and N is the total number of investors.
This ratio will be instrumental in our analysis; a larger (smaller) ratio represents a more (less) concentrated ownership structure which is meant to resemble a country where a small number of banks (multitudes of bondholders) hold a large share of the country's debt. Furthermore, each investor has access to additional funds, which may be used to …nance new government debt or placed in alternative forms of investments outside of this country. We let b t j denote the amount of new funding provided by investor j to the government in period t, and B t the total amount of new funding by all investors with existing ties to the country.
The payo¤ to investor j from lending new funds is the return it receives from the government plus the return it receives on its current investments in the country. The former can be compared to the return the investor could get by placing the same amount of capital in alternative assets outside the country. We assume that an investor's best alternative investment is a risk-free asset that pays a time-invariant interest rate R between any two adjacent periods. We let r t denote the endogenously determined interest rate the investors receive when providing new funds to the government. In what we call "normal times," this interest r t multiplied by any new amount lent to the government, together with a time-invariant interest received at rate I on the pre-existing investments in this country, is the period-t payo¤ of investor j. There is, however, also a chance that the country will undergo an economic crisis. In such "times of turmoil," the values of the pre-existing investments are negatively a¤ected. After having speci…ed the timing of the game we
will describe formally what happens if the country enters such a time of turmoil.
The formal timing within each period of the game is the following: any government debt accumulated in previous periods …rst has to be re-paid with interest, and the government has to tax its citizens to raise the funds necessary for this re-payment. The investors receive interest payments on their pre-existing investments in the country. Second, the incumbent politician chooses how much to spend on new public goods in this period. We denote this spending by G t . Third, the politician attempts to borrow the funds necessary for the provision of public goods from its pre-existing investor base; formally, it does so by o¤ering to pay an interest rate r t on any new lending provided to the government in this period (for instance by issuing one-period …xed rate bonds). These investors simultaneously decide how much to lend to the government, with their total amount of lending denoted B t . Fourth, if the new lending provided (in the third stage) is not su¢ cient to fund the spending on public goods (determined in the second stage), the government has to scramble for additional borrowing from international investors who lack pre-existing ties to the country. Fifth, the impact of the public good is felt by the citizens. Politicians are limited to one term in o¢ ce in our model. Hence, a party in control of political o¢ ce has to change its candidate between elections. We assume this occurs in the middle of the electoral cycle, between a non-election period and an election period. In the beginning of any election period, the party in control appoints a new candidate. This candidate becomes the de-facto (though not necessarily the formal) leader of the party, makes the decisions about public spending and government borrowing, and is thought of as the "incumbent" in the upcoming election. If the party in power again wins the election, this incumbent stays and leads the party through the post-election period, then (de-facto) hands over control to its successor at the beginning of the next election period. If, instead, the challenger wins the election, it makes the spending and borrowing decisions in the post-election period; then, as it too is term limited and cannot run for election a second time, it hands over control of its party at the beginning of the next (election) period, and its successor runs as the incumbent in the election.
These assumptions, regarding term limits and the handover of political leadership, may seem extreme. However, while the setup can be interpreted literally, as describing a system where a ruling party changes its leader between elections, it may also be thought of as a presidential system where (term-limited) presidents choose "anointed successors", with the e¤ect that these successors run as de facto incumbents. 3 For our setup to be appropriate, it is (only) necessary that the voters credit the chosen successors with at least some of the responsibility for economic successes or failures.
To further specify the details of the model, we need the exact expression for the government's budget constraint and voters'constraints, establishing how taxes, borrowing and competence translates into consumption, public goods and utility levels. These constraints are:
its income minus its taxes paid. The second constraint represents the utility the representative citizen receives from public goods, and is determined by the amount of public spending (G t ) and the quality (Q p ) of the incumbent politician. The third condition is the government's budget constraint. The right hand side is the amount collected in taxes in period t. It has to equal the sum of the repayments for the borrowing in the previous period from the investors with pre-existing ties (repaid with interest r t 1 ) and from the investors without such ties (repaid with interest I t 1 ).
As mentioned above, economic turmoil can a¤ect investment returns in the country. The probability of such turmoil is a¤ected by public borrowing. One could imagine a number of di¤erent possible links between borrowing and the possibility of economic turmoil. We assume that the probability of turmoil increases if the government has to scramble for funds from lenders with no pre-existing ties to the country. This implies that, for a given level of public borrowing G, the probability of there not being a crisis increases relative to the amount of new funding B extended by vested investors. Formally, if we de…ne this probability
as a function of the share of funding provided by pre-existing lenders to cover public spending G, we assume that p 0 > 0. We furthermore assume that this function is linear (so p 00 = 0), and that there will be no crash if the government manages to borrow all of the money it needs for new spending from investors with standing …nancial ties (p (G) = 1). 4
When it comes to the consequences of an economic crash/turmoil, we presuppose that it negatively a¤ects the value of existing investments in the country. More speci…cally, we assume that no return is received on existing investments in the period following the crash. We also assume, however, that the government can repay its outstanding debt issued in the period preceding the turmoil, and that nothing else changes as a consequence of turmoil. One could imagine other factors, such as wages, changing as a result of the crisis, but we hold these factors constant to focus on the changes most relevant to our analysis.
Equilibrium Predictions
We now turn to describing the behavior of the players in equilibrium. With the term "equilibrium" we will refer to symmetric markov perfect equilibrium. Because of the stationary nature of much of the analysis, we will often drop the superscript indicating time.
As a …rst step, it is helpful to derive the equilibrium behavior of a politician in a world without elections or …nancing considerations (i.e. with the interest rate and the probability of turmoil …xed). In this case, the incumbent would not pay attention to the intrinsic bene…t derived from holding o¢ ce because s/he could not in ‡uence the probability of receiving this bene…t. Hence, the politician would choose levels of borrowing and spending to maximize the utility of the citizens. If the incumbent decides to borrow and spend G, and its level of competence is Q, the government will be able to deliver public goods at a level g = G+Q. This delivers an immediate increase in citizens'
utility, but it comes with a cost in the form of higher taxes and lower consumption in the future.
Raising G in one period will lead to private consumption c = w(1 ) in the following period, where is determined by the amount that has to be repaid:
Since periods beyond the next one are not a¤ected by this borrowing, the incumbent politician simply maximizes the expected sum of the utility from public goods and private consumption, with the latter discounted by as it takes place in a later period:
Maximizing this with respect to G leads to the following condition:
We can see that a decrease in the interest rate r, or in the discount rate , will lead the government to spend more on public goods. Both outcomes follow from a straight-forward tradeo¤ between the present and the next period. We also observe a wealth e¤ect: a representative citizen in a richer country (higher w) would prefer more spending on public goods.
Proposition 1 If the government can borrow at a …xed interest rate, the probability of economic turmoil is zero and the incumbent politician is con…dent to remain in power from any period to the next, the equilibrium level of borrowing is given by condition (1). In this case, the borrowing and spending on public goods decreases with the interest rate (r) and the discount rate ( ), while it increases with country's wealth (w).
We now consider governments'…nancing constraints by endogenizing interest rates and adding the possibility of economic turmoil to our model. We begin by characterizing investor behavior.
Suppose that in an arbitrary period, an investor purchases government bonds at a one-period interest rate r. This new lending bene…ts the creditor both through its investment return (the interest rate paid to an investor) and the new liquidity support it provides for the creditor's initial investment (which makes the government less likely to default, and an economic crisis less probable).
The opportunity cost of this lending for the investor is the foregone interest it could have received by investing in alternative assets located outside of the country: b j R. Formally, placing this amount b j outside the country would deliver the following expected returns for investor j:
where B j is the total amount of national lending done by the other investors with pre-existing ties. If the initial creditor decides to lend b j to this country's government, it delivers the following expected returns:
Comparing the marginal rates of return, keeping in mind the linearity of the function p, we see the lenders will invest exclusively outside the country if R > r + X N I, while they will invest as much as they can inside the country (i.e. fully fund the new government debt) if this inequality is reversed. Under this constraint, optimal behavior for the government implies paying the lowest possible interest rate where vested creditors are still willing to fund the government. The interest rate is in part determined by creditors' ownership dispersion, which will ultimately play a vital role in deriving our …nal results. In our current equilibrium, it must be the case that R = r + X N I. Hence, if we let r E denote the equilibrium interest rate paid by the government, and a the slope of the function p( ), 5 we have:
Having characterized the equilibrium behavior of the investors, we turn to the incumbent politicians. In non-election periods, their objective is again identical to that of the voters. The maximization problem for the politician is: max G;r G + E (Q) + u w Gr t =M :Replacing the interest rate with r E from (2) would give us the optimization problem for the incumbent. This expression would be useful as a comparison with the election-period optimization problem, but is of less interest in itself. Hence, we turn directly to election years, where we have to add the exogenous bene…t of holding o¢ ce to describe the incumbent's incentives. If we let e denote the incumbent's (endogenously determined) probability of winning the election, as perceived at the time when the choice of G is made, we have the following objective:
To solve this maximization, we need to determine how the probability of winning, e, depends on the level of spending, G. Note that the voters in this model care about selecting the most competent politician. They are rational in the sense that they only take into account things that will a¤ect their utility in the future; that is, they are not intrinsically "retrospective"in their voting behavior. They do, however, use the past to form expectations about the future competence of incumbent politicians. Furthermore, any di¤erences in the intrinsic quality of competing politicians are unknown to everyone at the beginning of any election period, so the politicians cannot condition the level of spending on their own quality. Knowing this, the voters can, after having observed the level of public services provided to them, infer the competence of the incumbent politician. The citizens'rational response is then to use a cuto¤ rule such that incumbent politicians are re-elected only if their competence exceeds a certain level, which is determined by the expected quality of the challenger. With this in mind, we can derive the incumbent's probability of winning:
where G is the equilibrium value of public spending, and G is the level chosen by the incumbent.
Using this expression, we can write the incumbent's problem as:
Still assuming the incumbent perceives the interest rate as beyond its control, we can derive the following …rst-order condition:
We can gain insights into the behavior of incumbent politicians by comparing this condition (4) with the base model condition (1). The left-hand side of these two expressions are identical, while the right-hand side of (4) is greater than the right-hand side of equation (1). From this we can infer that the equilibrium level of G is greater in (1). This result establishes the existence of political budget cycles in the baseline version of our model, and we summarize it in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the incumbent politicians take the interest rate as given, the equilibrium level of public spending is greater in election years than in non-election years.
Finally, in the full model with elections and …nancing constraints (i.e. endogenous interest rate and possibility of economic crash), we have the following objective for the politician:
Di¤erentiating gives us the following …rst-order condition:
Using the functional form for the utility, u(c) = log(c), we can solve for G:
To analyze the implications of a country's debt structure, recall that greater creditor ownership concentration (an increase in x) is due to either an increase in the total pre-existing investments, X;
or a decrease in the number of investors, N . Let G (x) be the function that gives the equilibrium value of G as a function of x from expression (5). If we di¤erentiate this function, we have:
Now, remember that dE=dx is assumed to be positive, which means that dG=dx is greater than zero. This means that an increase in x (a rise in ownership concentration) will lead to an increase in the amount of new public spending (and associated borrowing). Furthermore, note that this happens through a direct e¤ect, captured by the …rst term in (5), and through an "election e¤ect", captured by the second term. We summarize in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 The public de…cit is smaller in countries where creditor ownership dispersion is greater, meaning either the total number of vested creditors is greater, or the total stock of invested capital is smaller. This holds for both election and non-election years, but the e¤ ect is stronger in election years.
This proposition highlights the impact of the investors'collective action problem, which comes from the fact that lenders with sizeable pre-existing investments will be more concerned about a country's potential economic problems, and thus more inclined to extend (new) loans to cover de…cits in order to hold down the likelihood of turmoil. Strategically-minded incumbents understand this creditor predicament and are willing to run greater de…cits when they interact with investors that have large, vested interests in the country.
Summarizing the Model: Debt Structure' s Policy Implications
These theoretical results suggest that bankers are the types of creditors most likely to provide their debtors with a …nancial backstop. Bankers'willingness to inject new money into their debtors re ‡ects the nature of commercial bank lending, which is characterized by a small, centralized pool of creditors with high concentrated exposures to their borrowers. As a result, the return of their money is directly linked to debtors'…nancial health. If they were to cut …nancing fully, it would accelerate their debtors' road to economic turmoil. By keeping borrowers a ‡oat, these centralized creditors are safeguarding their own balance sheets from pro…tability shocks. One real-world interpretation of this result is that the promise of new funds allows debtors to veer from calls for budget discipline often embedded in loan agreements. Ironically, our model suggests that being able to solve a collective action problem leaves bankers with less sway over debtor government policies.
By contrast, we surmise that collective action failures are more common in global bond …nancing, given its ownership dispersion among creditors. When credit risk is channeled across such a large pool of …nanciers, creditors not only reduce their exposure to borrowers, but also their stake in their …nancial futures. They hold too small a share of borrowers' debt exposure to warrant providing new funds. These predictions are in line with Olson's collective action theory, which claims that large, heterogeneous groups often experience coordination failures (Olson 1965) . Group members, with low personal stakes in the collective good, often prefer to survive without it than pay their share. However, collective action failures typically impede groups from pressuring governments. In this case, decentralized creditors bene…t from their coordination problem; it indirectly increases their in ‡uence over debtor governments. If countries do not demonstrate commitment to economic policies that ensure debt repayment, bondholders can cut their …nancial ties without incurring a severe pro…tability shock. Hence, our model suggests that compared to vested bankers, bondholders' credible threat to cease new funding allows them to more crudely impose austerity demands.
In addition to this general e¤ect, our model anticipates that elections intensify the disciplining e¤ect of bond market indebtedness. In line with previous political business cycle models, our model shows that information asymmetries between the government and the people can often lead to political budget cycles, or spending increases before elections (see Proposition 2). However, we …nd that such electoral cycles are also conditional on the government's debt structure (see Proposition 3).
To draw new investments from decentralized bondholders during periods of political uncertainty, governments must raise interest rates on new public debt, which constrains politicians from using de…cit spending before elections. If governments do not meet bondholders' policy expectations, they risk precipitating capital exit and a destabilizing shock. Hence, our model suggests thatholding constant the total investment in a country -greater ownership dispersion among creditors (an increase in total investors) should decrease macroeconomic cyclicality around elections. Additionally, a reduction in each creditor's standing investment (a dilution of creditor exposure) -holding constant the number of investors -should also decrease electoral cyclicality.
Empirical Tests
To evaluate our theoretical statements systematically, we translate the propositions into the following testable hypothesis:
H1: A shift to decentralized bond …nance (characterized by greater ownership dispersion) will lead to improved …scal balances, with a particularly strong e¤ect in election years. Relative to a centralized …nance regime (characterized by high creditor concentration), such a shift will also lead to a decrease in in ‡ation and economic growth during election years.
To test our hypothesis, we journey to Latin America, a region that is ideally suited for our analysis because it o¤ers signi…cant variation in public debt composition. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, large banks had provided the majority of cross-border capital ‡ows to the region (Frieden 1987) . The 1990s Brady Restructuings converted this commercial bank debt, which many countries had defaulted on during the 1980s debt crisis, into market-traded debt held by a diversi…ed group of global investors. These restructurings helped fuel a surge in Latin American bond issuance, which quickly replaced commercial bank loans as the region's primary funding source (see Figure A .1 in the appendix).
How did this dramatic change in debt …nancing a¤ect creditors and debtors in Latin America?
Before these restructurings, creditors often injected new money into their debtors during hard economic times. For example, when Mexico ignited the 1982 debt crisis by announcing a 90-day debt moratorium, a small core of global bankers collectively responded by providing new loans to the region rather than cutting …nancial ties. 6 By comparison, after the Brady restructurings, creditors had redistributed risk across a large decentralized pool of …nanciers -who were more likely to sell their bondholdings than lend defensively during hard times -making the region more susceptible to sudden capital withdrawals. Recall that to prevent such out ‡ows, we expect governments to exhibit greater discipline generally, and particularly during election years. In the rest of this section, we will test this proposed explanation more rigorously. Speci…cally, in what follows we operationalize our hypothesis (H1) with the following baseline regression equation:
where Y it k =economic indicator; where k = a; b; c with a = …scal balance, and b = in ‡ation, and c = GDP growth; where Elections it = election variable; where d it = the share of decentralized bond …nance relative to total external public debt; and Elections it d it = the interaction between decentralized …nancing and elections. The index i = country and t = year. X it = vector of control variables; and Y it k ;t 1 = economic dependent variable (one year lag). The term n i = dummy for each country, intended to capture unobserved country e¤ects, while " it = error term.
To test the hypotheses, we focus on the coe¢ cients on Elections it , d it (decentralized bond …nance), and in particular, the interaction terms between these variables. A positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term, when the government's …scal balance is the dependent variable, would provide support for the hypothesis that decentralized …nance improves …scal balances (i.e. narrows budget de…cits or bolsters budget surpluses) before elections. Similarly, a negative coe¢ cient when in ‡ation / growth is the dependent variable would con…rm the hypothesis that bond …nancing has a de ‡ationary electoral e¤ect.
Data and Methodology
We base our empirical tests on a panel of data covering 16 democratic countries in Latin
America from 1961-2011. Employing the dataset, we can observe how Latin America -a region known for its high indebtedness -governed through considerable …nancial volatility beginning with the 1982 debt crisis and through the most recent global crisis. We also adjudicate between our theoretical priors about debt structure and the e¤ect of IMF conditionality using a variable that measures whether a country participated in the IMF-led Baker Plan, a debt restructruing that called for austerity and predated bond market securitization.
Latin America's predominance of presidential systems makes it an ideal setting to examine political business cycles. The presence of election-timing that is …xed and constitutionally-mandated avoids endogeneity problems with the election variable, 7 or the possibility that current economic conditions re ‡ect political tinkering with election dates.
We present our …ndings using both …xed e¤ects and generalized methods of moments (GMM)
estimators. The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we use a series of basic regression models to test for the traditional political business cycle, presenting evidence about the e¤ect of elections on government budgets and core macroeconomic indicators: in ‡ation and growth. Second, in the crux of the analysis, we analyze the impact of decentralized debt on …scal policy and the economy; in addition to the direct e¤ect, we condition decentralized debt on elections to evaluate its e¤ect during election years. All models are estimated with robust standard errors, clustered by country. Fixed year e¤ects were tested and removed since they were not statistically signi…cant and did not a¤ect the main results. In the appendix, we include data sources and descriptive statistics.
Data Description: Independent Variables
Elections According to political business cycle theorists, politicians' desire to maintain o¢ ce compels them to aggressively intervene in the economy. In line with this premise, we limit our unit of analysis to democratically competitive elections, which are classifed based on whether there is electoral alternation (Przeworksi et. al. 2000) . Employing this classi…cation, we code a total of 139 contested presidential elections that span the entire dataset from 1961 to 2011 (see Figure   A .2 in appendix). We study presidential rather than legislative contests because historically Latin American economic policy is more strongly in ‡uenced by the executive than by other public actors.
After classifying these elections, we then constructed a binary variable, Election it , as a preelection dummy for …scal stimulus and growth, but as a post-election dummy for in ‡ation. We employ the separate post-election dummy variable to account for the expected lag between economic policy decisions and in ‡ation. According to macroeconomic theory, monetary policy a¤ects the economy incrementally, with in ‡ationary pressures often mounting between a half year and a year and a half. Fiscal policy may also have a lag, but generally a¤ects the economy more quickly (Friedman 1970 ). Given such potential lags, we use the post-election dummy to track in ‡ation both during the election year and subsequent years. indebtedness. However, as global bond account for a higher share of government debt -relative to alternative external …nancing sources such as bank lending -we should be more likely to observe …scal discipline and in ‡ation control.
Control Variables
We control for a variety of global economic factors, domestic economic variables, and institutional factors that may a¤ect national …scal balances, growth, and in ‡ation.
As past economic performance in ‡uences present economic conditions, we also include a lagged dependent variable. Finally, we use a slightly di¤erent set of controls for the …scal policy and growth/in ‡ation regressions, as we expect di¤erent factors to be important for di¤erent outcomes (for more details, see the appendix).
Empirical Results
The …rst series of basic regression models display the unconditional e¤ects of the independent variables on budget balances and the economy. These e¤ects are unconditional in that they ignore the government's debt structure at the time of elections, which in the regressions means the interaction variables between elections and bond …nancing are omitted. We …nd evidence that primary budget de…cits deteriorate more during elections than other time periods. In fact, the coe¢ cient on the election variable is negative and statistically signi…cant (see model 1 in Table 1 ). These results are consistent with empirical studies that have found a political de…cit cycle both in Latin America and developing economies more generally.
Does such …scal tinkering have an e¤ect on the macroeconomy? Perhaps, governments increase de…cit spending to target political supporters with public works projects or salary increases before elections, but do not provide su¢ ciently large stimulus to a¤ect the broad economy. For example, the OECD literature …nds evidence of pre-electoral …scal stimulus, but no signi…cant increase in aggregate economic activity before elections (Drazen 2001) . We …nd a similar pattern. Despite the appearance of a political de…cit cycle, there is no evidence that elections stimulate Latin American economies. The election coe¢ cients for both the in ‡ation and growth regressions are statistically insigni…cant (see model 1 in Tables 2-3) .
We …nd considerable support for a general bond …nancing e¤ect on policy making and in ‡a-tion control. Across the …rst two basic regression models, the bond-…nancing coe¢ cient exhibits a statistically signi…cant relationship with both governments' budget balances and in ‡ation. In other words, a greater reliance on global bond …nancing corresponds to improved budget balances (narrower budget de…cits or higher budget surpluses) and lower in ‡ation. 8 Finally, the control variables results indicate that the coe¢ cient for global growth is statistically signi…cant across all of the unconditional models (Tables 1-3) . Global growth is associated with improved budget balances, higher domestic growth, and moderate in ‡ation. In line with expectations, interest rates and executive constraints are negatively and positively correlated with budget balances respectively, and terms of trade gains appear to boost economic activity.
Does this estimated impact of bond …nancing di¤er between election and non-election years?
Our theory suggest that the cyclicality around elections should decrease as governments become more dependent on decentralized bond markets. In the conditional regression models (models 3-7
in Table 1 ), decentralized bond …nance has a strong and statistically signi…cant mitigating e¤ect on budget de…cits during election periods, lending support to our primary hypothesis. In line with our theoretical model and empirical hypothesis, bond indebtedness appears to promote budgetary discipline in highly indebted countries. Does it also have a disciplining e¤ect on the economy during election periods? The conditional models (see Tables 2 and 3) examine this relationship. The regression results show that bond …nance has a statistically signi…cant and strong moderating e¤ect on in ‡ation and growth during elections. In other words, the higher a country's share of bond …nancing, the less likely its politicians are to craft a high growth, high in ‡ation election cycle.
The coe¢ cients for the control variables generally correspond to expectations (Tables 1-3) .
Global growth continues to be associated with improved budget balances, higher domestic growth, and moderate in ‡ation. As expected, domestic investment is also positively related to domestic growth. Finally, when the primary …scal balance (lagged by one year) is a control variable; its coef…cient has a statistically signi…cant relationship with both in ‡ation and growth, but in a negative and positive direction respectively. In other words, a narrower budget de…cit is associated with lower average in ‡ation and higher growth.
To extract a meaningful relationship between bond …nancing and elections, we can calculate the marginal e¤ects of elections over di¤erent values of decentralized bond …nance. In Figures 2 and 3, we observe that as global bond markets account for a higher share of government …nancing, the e¤ect of elections on in ‡ation and economic growth not only becomes greater in magnitude, but also more highly statistically signi…cant. These results provide considerable support for our theoretical framework and empirical hypothesis.
Robustness Checks
In a series of robustness checks, we found that the correlation between decentralized …nancing and the economy is markedly resilient. First, we repeated the statistical tests just described using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator to help mitigate concerns about the possibility of reverse causality in the independent variables. Overall, the GMM results support the governing hypothesis that the relationship between elections and the economy is contingent on decentralized …nance. 9 Elections occurring under bond …nancing are positively correlated with government budget balances, but negatively correlated with in ‡ation and growth (see models 2 and 6 in Tables 1-3) .
We also inserted several additional control variables -including left partisanship and the existence of an IMF program -into the original models to account for the potential in ‡uence of political and institutional factors on government budgets and the economy. None of these additional controls signi…cantly changed the size, direction, or statistical signi…cance of the key results (see models 3
and 4 in Tables 1-3) .
Notably, the statistically signi…cant IMF coe¢ cients in Table 1 suggest that governments under IMF programs tend to improve budget balances, but IMF programs alone do not appear to be a su¢ cient condition for austerity. Before the 1990s'debt securitizations that developed Latin American bond markets, the Baker Plan variable captures the years where an IMF-led sovereign debt restructuring was in e¤ect (see model 5 in Tables 1-3) . Embedded with conditionality agreements, these restructurings should make narrower …scal de…cits more likely if an IMF agreement alone was a su¢ cient condition for budget discipline. The Baker Plan coe¢ cients, however, are statistically insigni…cant, suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that IMF programs during the Baker years had no e¤ect on budget balances. At the same time, we should also expect in ‡ation control to be more likely under IMF programs. While the Baker Plan coe¢ cient is statistically signi…cant, its positive sign suggests that average in ‡ation tended to be higher during these years.
These …ndings support scholarship that has found that Latin American governments exhibited low rates of compliance with their IMF programs during the 1980s (Haggard 1985; Edwards 2001) . This relationship appears to change in the 1990s as bonds comprise a larger share of sovereign debt, when both bond …nance and IMF agreements are strongly correlated with budget discipline. Hence, our work does not rule out the possibility that conditionality may lead to more …scal discipline, but it does show that the magnitude of its e¤ects depends on the structure of government debt.
Notwithstanding these …ndings about the importance of debt composition, might the size of external debt itself be an important driver of austerity? We expect that high indebtedness should at least be a basic prerequisite for electoral austerity. Noting that external debt in Latin America has rarely been manageable -averaging 40 percent of GDP in the region during the last …fty years, a level that is well-above the 20 percent threshold that is considered "safe" for many emerging market countries 10 -we reran the statistical tests dropping any observations below the 20 percent threshold and later omitting those below a more conservative 25 percent threshold. Importantly, the coe¢ cients on the interaction e¤ects do not change sign but are greater in magnitude, strengthening the initial positive relationship between decentralized …nance and election-year budget balances (see model 7 in Table 1 ) and negative relationship between decentralized …nance and the economy (see model 7 in Tables 2-3 ). Notably, above this external debt threshold, the marginal e¤ect of elections on budget balances shifts into positive territory for higher levels of bond indebtedness, meaning we observe small budget surpluses rather than the narrowing de…cits we …rst saw in Figure 1 .
As a …nal robustness check, we modi…ed the structure of the binary election variable to account for longer/shorter-than-expected policy lags between economic decisions and in ‡ation. Our theory predicts that when bonds account for a large share of external debt, we should observe a de ‡ationary e¤ect not only in the election year, but also the subsequent year. To account for a potentially evenlonger monetary policy lag, we also varied this lag structure by adding second year to the binary election variable. We also shifted the election variable to capture the possibility of a shorter policy lag by tracking in ‡ation patterns that predate the electoral campaign. These robustness tests did not yield any material changes.
Discussion
When countries have weak institutional transparency and few executive constraints, political economy theory expects politicians to use budget de…cits to engineer an election-timed boom, known as the political business cycle. But, why might we observe austerity in countries notwithstanding their level of institutional development? We have shown that the global …nancialization has profound e¤ects on domestic politics. When politicians from highly-indebted countries rely on decentralized bond markets (rather than centralized lending), they often exhibit more …scal discipline, which is particularly strong during election periods. In particular, might our results help us better understand contemporary events? To glean some insight into these questions, we can look outside of our sample to Southern Europe. Not only has the recent …nancial crisis generated tremendous interest among scholars, policy-makers and the general public, but it has brought the question of …scal responsibility to the forefront of European relations again. Fiscal responsibility was initially a centerpiece of the Eurozone convergence criteria, which mandated limits on government borrowing and national debt, in the prelude to the 2001 dawn of the monetary union. However, the sovereign debt di¢ culties at the heart of the 2009-10 Eurozone crisis have underscored the lack of …scal responsibility during the euro's …rst decade.
In the wake of the crisis, these debt di¢ culties have catalyzed Southern Europe's adoption of austerity policies, despite running counter to many of its incumbent governments'ideological and political roots. One often cited reason for the region's turn toward austerity has been coercive pressures from Europe's troika of international creditors: European Commission, the European 1 1 Presidents are constitutionally banned from immediate reelection, but García plans to run for reelection in 2016.
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Our analysis brings a new set of considerations to the austerity question, suggesting that the structure of sovereign debt …nancing may also be an important determinant of economic policy choices.
To illustrate, let us brie ‡y journey to the Iberian Peninsula, home to Spain and Portugal, two nations that share a common characteristic with the Latin American experience: they have become reliant on external …nancing, and speci…cally global bond markets to fund their government de…cits. Notwithstanding this similarity, investors have often considered Latin America and Southern Europe to be institutionally and developmentally distinct (Mosley 2003) . As members of the European Union and the European Monetary Union, Spain and Portugal have bene…ted from a sound institutional framework that allowed them to readily attract capital. Investors deemed that such established democracies with a history of stable economic governance were relatively free from default risk. By contrast, Latin America -a highly indebted region with a less developed institutional infrastructure -often struggled to overcome investor concerns about its legacy of debt crises.
If we …nd that high bond indebtedness is also a precursor to austerity in Spain and Portugal, two countries that are institutionally very di¤erent from Latin America, it suggests that our central …ndings about high bond market indebtedness may generalize beyond Latin America (Mill 2011 ).
In the years leading up to the eurozone crisis, bond indebtedness accounted for an average of In addition to this generalized e¤ect, we also observe pronounced electoral austerity in these two countries during their 2011 elections. This pattern is particularly surprising given that socialist parties were governing in both countries. In Spain, the incumbent PSOE party faced fervent protests against austerity from its political base, including the trade union movement. In Portugal, Prime Minister José Sócrates (PS) resigned in March 2011 after failing to secure approval for a new …scal austerity package that featured social spending cuts that were unpopular with many of his supporters within his own party. In light of these domestic pressures, why would these socialist governments have pursued austerity before new elections?
We present a possible explanation. Their high bond indebtedness made both governments susceptible to capital ‡ight. During 2011, capital ‡ight contributed to both Spanish and Portuguese bonds yields surging further by mid-year, and crossing the six percent threshold considered by investors to be sustainable in both countries. Facing these deteriorating credit conditions, Span- In summary, there is little trace of the political business cycle during these two elections. While a full analysis of Southern Europe's recent experience is well beyond the scope of this paper, the electoral pattern in Spain and Portugal in 2011 is consistent with our theoretical expectations.
Governments adhere to …scal discipline when creditors' ownership dispersion imposes a credible capital exit threat, suggesting that the e¤ect of bond market indebtedness on public spending choices may not be unique to Latin America.
Conclusion
We have examined how a reliance on external …nancing can a¤ect the economic policy choices of highly-indebted governments. Compared to those countries that have little or no foreign debt, highly-indebted governments are less insulated from the international investment community. With fewer resources to draw on domestically from less-developed tax bases and capital markets, many cash-strapped nations have little choice but to raise …nancing internationally. In exchange for funds, debtor governments are typically required by their creditors to pursue …scal restraint to increase the likelihood that their debts are repaid. Whether we observe …scal discipline, however, is often conditional on a country's external debt structure.
We have developed and tested a model that shows that de…cit spending declines with the greater dispersion of creditor ownership that is characteristic of global bond markets. In other words, we expect that globally-decentralized bond markets should have more of a disciplining e¤ect on macroeconomic governance than other types of more centralized credit such as commercial banking. 13 In our cross-national test in Latin America -a region that is known for its historically high level of external indebtedness -we …nd that governments whose global bond portfolios account for a greater share of their external debt are more likely to have narrower budget de…cits. This e¤ect holds generally, but is most pronounced during elections. These examples suggest that our theoretical framework could be fruitfully extended in several ways. We have shown that global ownership di¤usion can plague creditor coordination and breed austerity in countries with high bond indebtedness. By exploring the e¤ects of other dimensions of the international …nancial architecture beyond ownership dispersion, such as the legal evolution of bond contracts, we can gain a better understanding for creditor-debtor relationships, and ultimately for thinking about how the structure of global …nance may a¤ect future sovereign crises.
1 5 Over the last year, the Kirchner government has attempted to restore its credibiliity wiith international investors by repaying its long-standing Paris Club arrears and compensating the Spanish energy company, Repsol, for the government's YPF expropriation.
1 6 For more details on China's increased role in global …nance, see Steinberg 2014 and McDowell and Liao 2014. Election Dummy For the in ‡ation regressions, the binary variable takes on the value of 1 in election year and subsequent year, and 0 otherwise. For the …scal balance and growth regressions, the binary variable takes on the value of 1 in an election year and the preceding N-1 years, and 0 otherwise, where N = 2 or 3.
Political Handbook of the World (2006 World ( -2007 2007 -2008 2008 -2009 Average in ‡ation is converted to its natural logarithm.
Control Variable Discussion
In the regression analysis, we use a slightly di¤erent set of controls for the …scal policy and growth/in ‡ation regressions, as we expect di¤erent factors to be important for di¤erent outcomes. When employing national …scal balances as the dependent variable, there are several standard control variables that are unique to such regressions. They are an output gap (Domestic output gap) and an unemployment (Unemployment) and in ‡ation measure (In ‡ation) -both lagged by one year -to control for a country's position in its economic cycle. In addition, we use a domestic interest rate variable (Interest rate) to account for ‡uctuations in the cost of credit that tend to ease or tighten budgetary constraints, and a measure of constraints on executive power (Executive constraints) based on the assumption that budgetary cycles are less common when presidents confront greater checks and balances. In all of the regressions, we also use a series of control variables to account for alternative factors beyond the structure of …nance that may in ‡uence the economy. First, we control for the global growth (Global growth), given that our sample includes many small open economies. Because many Latin American countries are dependent on primary commodity exports, we also include a country's terms of trade position (Terms of trade) in our regressions to account for commodity volatility. We also control for economic openness, employing a measure of imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP (Trade). In general, we expect global ‡uctuations in growth, trade, and commodities to in ‡uence domestic budget balances, growth, and in ‡ation. Finally, we include a measure of overall external indebtedness (External debt) to control for its e¤ect on …scal policy and the economy.
Some other control variables are exclusive to the growth and in ‡ation regressions. We control for the primary …scal balance as a percentage of GDP (Fiscal balance)-lagged by one year to avoid any possible endogeneity-based on the assumption that …scal stimulus drives both economic growth and in ‡ation. We use the primary …scal balance (net of interest payments on public debt) rather than the general government balance (inclusive of interest payments) because it is the more appropriate measure of the government's …scal policy stance in highly-indebted countries. When economic growth is the dependent variable, we also control for the rate of domestic investment as a percentage of GDP (Domestic investment) because investment is often a key engine of growth. In addition, we include the in ‡ation rate (In ‡ation) -lagged one year -to control for the e¤ect of price instability on economic growth. When in ‡ation is the dependent variable, we include annual GDP growth (Growth) -lagged on year -to account for its e¤ect on price cyclicality. We also employ M2 as a percentage of GDP as a proxy for …nancial sector size (Domestic …nancial depth), assuming that nations with stronger …nancial systems tend to have lower in ‡ation.
Finally, to account for institutional factors that may a¤ect budget balances, growth, and in‡ation, we add several control variables in our robustness checks, including measures of IMF participation (IMF ), left partisanship (Left governments), and legal central bank autonomy (Central bank independence). This measure was ultimately not included in the regression results because it assigns numerical values to countries that do not vary over time, making it indistinguishable from the country dummies already incorporated in the model.
